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Summary. Let us consider two new perfect substitute durable products which are
produced and sold in a market by two competing ﬁrms.
Looking at a potential buyer, we build a stochastic rule by which she purchases the
good from one of the two ﬁrms (so that she becomes an adopter). The model is
considered discrete in time and space. The probability of transition from the non
adopter state to the adopter one depends on an imitation mechanism (word-of-
mouth) as well as on the pricing and advertising policies of the producers/sellers. It
is assumed that only actual information about the market determine the evolution
in the subsequent time step so that a Markov process arises. Both ﬁrms maximize
their expected discounted proﬁts by choosing optimal marketing strategies. Suitable
equilibria are characterized and, because of the lack of convexity in the model, the
simulated annealing algorithm is proposed to compute them.
1 Introduction
The diﬀusion of a new product (innovation) in a market has been modelled
ﬁrstly in the seminal paper by Bass (1969).
The population of potential consumers is divided into two classes: the class of
the adopters - i.e. individuals which have already bought the new product and
which spread information about it; the non-adopters or uninformed - i.e. indi-
viduals which are not yet informed about the innovation. The Bass equation
gives the dynamic of cumulative adopters as a function of advertising and
interpersonal communication. The Bass model and its early generalizations
have been used, since the 1980, to address and solve optimal-control problems
governed by diﬀerential equations. For a review of the decision problems re-
lated to the diﬀusion of new products in a market see Dockner et al. (2000)
and Jørgensen and Zaccour (2004).2 Luigi De Cesare and Andrea Di Liddo
In this paper we ﬁrstly discuss a duopoly model of innovation diﬀusion. There
are two competing ﬁrms which produce and sell two versions of the new prod-
uct which are perfect substitutes and diﬀer only for the brand of the producer.
Advertising and interpersonal contacts also contribute to the diﬀusion of the
new product. Moreover consumer’s decisions depend on the price of the prod-
uct and, since the two products are substitutes, consumers react also to the
diﬀerence between the prices. The model in this paper is presented in Section 2
as a stochastic rule by which a potential buyer can become an adopter of one
of the two products. The model is considered discrete in time and space. The
probability of transition from the state of non-adopter to the state of adopter
of one kind of products depends on an imitation mechanism (word-of-mouth)
as well as on the pricing and advertising policies of the producer/seller. Since
it is assumed that only actual information about the market determines the
evolution in the next time step, then the process is a Markov one. After a
brief discussion about the features of innovation diﬀusion dynamics, a nonco-
operative game between the two ﬁrms is treated.
2 The Model
We consider a population of M (potential) consumers each of which can buy
at most one copy of a new durable product (innovation) choosing between
two perfect substitutes P1 and P2. The innovation is produced and sold by
two ﬁrms which can practise discrimination in prices since the two brands are
diﬀerently perceived by the consumers. Let us denote by An,i the number, at
time n, of the individuals who have already bought the product Pi manufac-
tured by the ﬁrm Fi, i =1 ,2. It is A0,i =0 .
We assume that potential consumers are convinced to buy the new product
through the advertising given by the two ﬁrms. The advertising performed by
the ﬁrm Fi has a (nonnegative) inﬂuence on both the sales of the ﬁrm Fi and
Fj and viceversa.
Let us denote by γi,n, i =1 ,2 the quantities (normalized to one) of the adver-
tising produced by the ﬁrm Fi at time n. The eﬀectiveness of the advertising
is measured through the functions gi and hi. Precisely gi(γi,n)r e p r e s e n t st h e
eﬀect on the sales of the ﬁrm Fi of the advertising made by the ﬁrm Fi;
whereas hi(γj,n) measures the inﬂuence on the sales of the ﬁrm Fi given by
the advertising made by the ﬁrm Fj, i  = j.
Furthermore people are convinced to buy the new product through interper-
sonal contacts with previous adopters. This eﬀect is modelled by parameter
ki,j which represents the eﬀect of word-of-mouth of Pi adopter’s to convince
a non adopter to buy the product Pj.
Obviously, price also inﬂuences the decision of a potential customer. Higher it
is the price, lower the probability that the product is purchased. A measure of
this eﬀect is given by a so-called price-response function qi(p1,n,p 2,n)w h e r e
pi,n is the price of the product Pi at time n.Optimal marketing decision in a duopoly: a stochastic approach 3
The following properties are assumed to hold about the functions gi, hi:
1. gi(0) = 0; i =1 ,2;
2. hi(0) = 0; i =1 ,2;
3. 0 ≤ gi(γi,n)+hi(γj,n) ≤ 1 i,j =1 ,2
Moreover the functions gi and hi are assumed to be increasing and concave
in their arguments to incorporate decreasing advertising returns.
We assume that the price-response function q1(p1,p 2) is increasing with
respect to p2 and that it is decreasing with respect to p1.F u r t h e r m o r e0≤
q1(p1,p 2) ≤ 1. The analogous properties hold for q2. In the rest of the paper
we choose price-response function as follows
 
q1(p1,p 2)=e x p ( −α1p1)ϕ1(p2 − p1)
q2(p1,p 2)=e x p ( −α2p2)ϕ2(p1 − p2)
where αi are positive constants and ϕi are increasing functions. So, potential
consumers react to the price of the product they are going to buy but they
also react to the diﬀerence between the prices of the two products.
We provide a stochastic rule for a potential buyer to become an adopter
of one of the two products P1, P2. The process is considered discrete in time
and we assume that decisions are taken at time n ∈{ 0,1,...,T − 1},w h e r e
T ∈ N.
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1i f t h e j-th individual is an adopter
of product Pi at time n
0i f t h e j-th individual is not yet an adopter
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If the j-th individual is not yet an adopter at time n, then she becomes





n+1 =( 1 ,0)|X
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The ﬁrst equality means that the probability to remain non adopter for an
individual who has not already adopted the innovation is 1−rn,An,1−rn,An,2.
The last two equalities mean that if the j-th individual is an adopter at time
n, then she remains an adopter for all the future time. The meaning of the
other equalities is obvious.
The stochastic process A =( An)n=0,...,T is a Markov chain. The state
space is given by the set
SM := {(l,j) ∈ N2|l + j ≤ M}.
SM has σM ≡
(M+1)(M+2)
2 elements.
Note that the Markov chain is nonhomogeneous: that is the transition
probabilities are non-stationary because at any time n they depend on the
advertising rates γi,n and on the selling prices pi,n, i =1 ,2.
Since there are no adopters at time n = 0, we have that the distribution
of the initial state is the vector π ∈ RσM, deﬁned by
πsl = P(A0 = sl)=
 
1i f sl =( 0 ,0)
0i f sl  =( 0 ,0).Optimal marketing decision in a duopoly: a stochastic approach 5
Setting i =( i1,i 2) ∈ SM and j =( j1,j 2) ∈ SM, the transition probabilities
are
P(An+1 = j |An = i)=
 
πn
i,j if i1 ≤ j1 and i2 ≤ j2
0o t h e r w i s e
where πn
i,j are given by
(M − i1 − i2)!





n,i,2 (1 − rn,i,1 − rn,i,2)
M−j1−j2
If the advertising levels and the selling prices are constant in time, then
the Markov chain is homogeneous. In this case let γi,n ≡ γi.I fγ1 + γ2 > 0,
then, by standard Markov chain asymptotic properties, it follows that
lim
n→+∞
P(An,1 + An,2 = M)=1 .
This means that, as the time horizon tends to inﬁnity, the whole population
adopts one of the two new products with probability one. If γ1 +γ2 =0 ,t h e n
nobody becomes an adopter.
3 The dynamic game
Let cp,i be the per unit cost of the product Pi. Moreover let us indicate by
cγ,i the unitary costs, paid by the ﬁrm Fi for the advertising made during the
period [0,T]. Here cp,i and cγ,i are given positive constants. Let δi > 0b et h e
(constant in time) one period instantaneous discount rate. The stochastic dis-




e−δik(pi,k − cp,i)(Ak+1,i − Ak,i) − cγ,iγi,k.
The ﬁrms perform control of a common stochastic discrete time dynamic
system which is a non-homogeneous Markov chain with one-step transition
matrix depending on control parameters. At every time step, each player
makes decision in order to maximize her total discounted payoﬀ for the plan-
ning period assuming that the other player does the same. We suppose that
each player knows the current state of the system (symmetric complete infor-
mation). We describe the game by the dynamic Nash equilibrium.
The random transition from the current state An to the next one An+1
depends only on the actions of players:
Φi,n := (γi,n(An),p i,n(An))
and the current state An.W ed e n o t eb y6 Luigi De Cesare and Andrea Di Liddo
ui,n(An+1 − An,Φ 1,n,Φ 2,n): =( pi,n − cp,i)(An+1,i − An,i) − cγ,iγi,n (1)
the ﬁrm current payoﬀ. We observe that the strategies of the ﬁrms at every
time step depend only on the current state of the system.
At time step n =0 ,1,...,T− 1, each ﬁrm chooses an optimal strategy:
Ψi,n(s)=( Φi,n(s),Φ i,n+1(s),...,Φ i,T−1(s)) ∀s ∈ SM
where
Φi,n(s)=( γi,n(s),p i,n(s)), ∀s ∈ SM,
maximizing the expected discounted sum of future one-period payoﬀs (1),




e−δi(k−n)ui,k(Ak+1 − Ak,Φ 1,k,Φ 2,k). (2)
Here En,s is the expected value conditioned on [An = s], that is the ﬁrms
make decisions observing the state of the system at time n.
The game solution consists in a dynamic Nash equilibrium. At time n,a




U1,n(s, ˆ Ψ1,n, ˆ Ψ2,n)=m a x
Ψ1,n
U1,n(s,Ψ1,n, ˆ Ψ2,n)
U2,n(s, ˆ Ψ1,n, ˆ Ψ2,n)=m a x
Ψ2,n
U2,n(s, ˆ Ψ1,n,Ψ 2,n)
(3)



























i,j = P(An+1 = j|An = i). Let’s
gT−n−1(s,in,...,iT−1): =ET−1,iT−1 f(s,in,...,iT−1,A T)
gT−n−2(s,in,...,iT−2): =ET−2,iT −2 gT−n−1(s,in,...,iT−2,A T−1)
. . .
g1(s,in+1): =En+1,in+1 g2(s,in+1,A n+2).
Then we have
En,sf(s,An+1,...,A T)=En,sg1(s,in+1)Optimal marketing decision in a duopoly: a stochastic approach 7
and hence
En,s f(s,An+1,...,A T)=En,s En+1,An+1 ...E T−1,AT−1 f(s,An+1,...,A T).




















En,s ui,n(An+1 − s)+e−δiEn,s Ui,n+1(An+1)
where n =0 ,1,...,T− 1, s ∈ SM and Ui,T ≡ 0.
Hence we can try to solve the problem by a dynamic programming algo-
rithm. Let’s
ˆ Ui,n(An,Φ 1,n,Φ 2,n): =Ui,n(An,(Φ1,n, ˆ Ψ1,n+1),(Φ2,n, ˆ Ψ2,n+1))
the payoﬀ of a ﬁrm corresponding to a given policy at time t and optimal
strategies for time t +1 ,...,T− 1.
If (ˆ Ψ1,n+1, ˆ Ψ2,n+1) is a Nash equilibrium for (3) at time n +1 a n d
(ˆ Φ1,n, ˆ Φ2,n) is a (unique) Nash equilibrium, for all s ∈ SM, of the following
problem:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
ˆ U1,n(s, ˆ Φ1,n, ˆ Φ2,n)=m a x
Φ1,n
En,s u1,n(An+1 − s,Φ1,n, ˆ Φ2,n)+
e−δ1En,s ˆ U1,n+1(An+1, ˆ Φ1,n+1, ˆ Φ2,n+1)
ˆ U2,n(s, ˆ Φ1,n, ˆ Φ2,n)=m a x
Φ2,n
En,su2,n(An+1 − s, ˆ Φ1,n,Φ 2,n)+
e−δ2En,s ˆ U2,n+1(An+1, ˆ Φ1,n+1, ˆ Φ2,n+1)
(4)
then (ˆ Ψ1,n, ˆ Ψ2,n)=( (ˆ Φ1,n, ˆ Ψ1,n+1),(ˆ Φ2,n ˆ Ψ2,n+1)) is a Nash equilibrium for
(3) at time n.













ui,n((h1,h 2)) + e−δi ˆ Ui,n+1(s +( h1,h 2))
 
πn
s,s+h8 Luigi De Cesare and Andrea Di Liddo
where
s =( s1,s 2,),h =( h1,h 2),M s = M − (s1 + s2)
π
n
s,s+h = P(An+1 = s +( h1,h 2)|An = s)=
Ms!





n,s,2(1 − rn,s,1 − rn,s,2)Ms−h1−h2
Using the dynamic programming techniques, we solve the problem (3) by
backward recursion starting from the last stage. At each stage n we solve the
problem (4), given that the stage n + 1 has already been solved. In other
words at stage n,t h ev a l u e sˆ Ui,n+1(s) are known for all s ∈ SM and for the
last stage we have ˆ Ui,T ≡ 0.
In order to obtain a numerical solution of the problem (4), we use the
following iterative algorithm (see Golubtsov et al. 2003). We choose an initial
policy Φ2k
1,n (where k =0 )f o rt h eﬁ r mF1 and we determine the optimal















Under suitable conditions the sequence (Φ2k
1,n,Φ
2k+1
2,n ), obtained iterating the
previous steps, converges to the solution of the problem (4). Because of the
complexity of the functions ηi it is hard to obtain analytical information i.e.
monotonicity, convexity etc. Also the existence and uniqueness of the optimal
response remains an open problem. We solve numerically the previous global
maximum problems using at each step k the Simulated Annealing algorithm.








are small according to a given precision.
In our simulation we consider the following functions for the advertising
eﬀects:
gi(γi): =ρi log(1 + γi)/log(2) hi(γj): =ξi log(1 + γj)/log(2)
where ρi ≥ 0, ξi ≥ 0a n dφi := ρi + ξi < 1. We choose δi =0 ,M =2 0a n d
T = 10. The other parameters are listed in table (1).
In the following pictures the expected returns of the ﬁrms, given the in-
formation at the initial time and when optimal price/advertising strategies
are performed, are plotted against the time. Precisely we can see the returns
on the left ﬁgure and the price/advertising proﬁles on the right ﬁgure. The
expected valuesOptimal marketing decision in a duopoly: a stochastic approach 9
Table 1. Simulation parameters
Figure cp,1 cp,2 cγ,1 cγ,2 ρ1 ρ2 ξ1 ξ2 α1 α2
1 0.40 0.50 1.20 0.80 0.40 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.45 0.50
2 0.40 0.50 1.50 0.80 0.40 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.45 0.50
3 0.40 0.40 1.00 0.80 0.30 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.50 0.50






−δik(ˆ pi,k − cp,i)(Ak+1,i − Ak,i) − cγ,iˆ γi,k
 
are computed by a Monte Carlo simulation generating a sample path of the
Markov chain (An)n=0,...,T. Note that, according to the standard literature,
the advertising proﬁles are decreasing in time while the price proﬁles are
decreasing at the beginning and then are deﬁnitively increasing.




































Fig. 1. Average payoﬀs and average price/advertising strategies











































Fig. 2. Average payoﬀs and average price/advertising strategies10 Luigi De Cesare and Andrea Di Liddo











































Fig. 3. Average payoﬀs and average price/advertising strategies









































Fig. 4. Average payoﬀs and average price/advertising strategiesOptimal marketing decision in a duopoly: a stochastic approach 11
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